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Abstract
Train machine learning models on sensitive user data has raised increasing privacy
concerns in many areas. Federated learning is a popular approach for privacy
protection that collects the local gradient information instead of real data. One
way to achieve a strict privacy guarantee is to apply local differential privacy into
federated learning. However, previous works do not give a practical solution due to
three issues. First, the noisy data is close to its original value with high probability,
increasing the risk of information exposure. Second, a large variance is introduced
to the estimated average, causing poor accuracy. Last, the privacy budget explodes
due to the high dimensionality of weights in deep learning models. In this paper,
we proposed a novel design of local differential privacy mechanism for federated
learning to address the abovementioned issues. It is capable of making the data
more distinct from its original value and introducing lower variance. Moreover,
the proposed mechanism bypasses the curse of dimensionality by splitting and
shuffling model updates. A series of empirical evaluations on three commonly used
datasets, MNIST, Fashion-MNIST and CIFAR-10, demonstrate that our solution
can not only achieve superior deep learning performance but also provide a strong
privacy guarantee at the same time.
1 Introduction
Many attractive applications involve training models using highly sensitive data, to name a few,
diagnosis of diseases with medical records, or genetic sequences [2]. In order to protect the privacy of
the training data, various privacy protection works have been proposed in the literature [17, 20, 22, 24].
The federated learning framework is of particular interest since it can provide a well-trained model
without touching any sensitive data directly [12, 18]. The original purpose of the federated learning
framework is to share the weights of the model trained on sensitive data instead of data directly.
However, some studies show that the weights also can leak privacy and recover the original sensitive
data [23]. In order to solve the problem, recent works start to use the differential privacy to protect the
private data with federated learning [3, 11, 21], but most of them can not give a practical solution for
deep learning model on complex dataset due to the trade-off between privacy budget and performance.
In previous approaches, there are several apparent concerns and challenges. First, the noisy data
is close to its original value with high probability, increasing the risk of information exposure. For
example, the price of a pen is 5. After data perturbation, the protected information is close to or
Preprint. Under review.
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Figure 1: The overview of LDP-FL.
around 5, such as 5.3. Second, a large variance is introduced to the estimated average, causing poor
accuracy. As a result, it requires more communication between the cloud and clients for the learning
converge. Third, the privacy budget explodes due to the high dimensionality of weights in deep
learning models. Last, to the best of our knowledge, no existing works have shown an excellent deep
learning performance on popular datasets such as MNIST [16], Fashion-MNIST [30] and CIFAR-10
[14], with a reasonably small privacy budget.
In this paper, we proposed Locally Differential Private Federated Learning (LDP-FL), a new local
differential privacy (LDP) mechanism to solve the above issues. As shown in Fig. 1, novelly designed
local data perturbation and local model weights splitting and shuffling are applied to a typical
federated learning system.
Our main contribution is multifold. First, we propose a new LDP mechanism, and show how to apply
it to federated learning. We prove our LDP mechanism is securer than existing mechanisms with
a much reduced risk of information exposure by making the perturbed data more distinct from its
original value. Second, we apply splitting and shuffling to each clients’ gradients to mitigate the
privacy degradation caused by high data dimension and many query iterations. Third, we prove that
our solution introduces less variance to average calculation, making it capable of presenting a better
model training performance. Moreover, we show that the traditional mechanisms used for centralized
differential privacy in which a trusted cloud is required could also be used for LDP, though they
are less secure than our mechanism. Last, we evaluate LDP-FL on three commonly used dataset in
previous works, MNIST [16], Fashion-MNIST [30] and CIFAR-10 [14]. The proposed mechanism
achieves a privacy budget of  = 1 with 0.97% accuracy loss on MNIST, a privacy budget of  = 4
with 1.32% accuracy loss on Fashion-MNIST, and a privacy budget of  = 10 with 1.09% accuracy
loss on CIFAR-10, respectively.
Due to limited space, all proofs and additional experiments are given in the appendix.
2 Preliminary
2.1 Local Differential Privacy
Formally, the definition of -LDP is given as below:
Definition 1. [6] A randomized mechanismM satisfies -LDP, for any pair input x and x′ in D,
and any output Y ofM,
Pr[M(x) = Y ] ≤ e · Pr[M(x′) = Y ]. (1)
where the inputs x and x′ are any two inputs. The privacy guarantee of mechanismM is controlled
by privacy budget [6], denoted as . A smaller value of  indicates a stronger privacy guarantee. The
immunity to post-processing [7] also works on LDP, which claims no algorithm can compromise the
differentially private output and make it less differentially private.
2.2 Federated Learning
Federated learning [18, 12] has been proposed and widely used in different approaches. The moti-
vation is to share the model weights instead of the private data for better privacy protection. Each
client, the owner of private training data, updates a model locally, and sends all gradients or weights
information to the cloud. The cloud aggregates such information from clients, updates a new central
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model (e.g., averaging all clients’ weights), and then distributes it back to a fraction of clients for
another round of model update. Such process is continued iteratively until a satisfying performance is
achieved. Note that, to minimize communication, each client might take several mini-batch gradient
descent steps in local model computation. To enchance the privacy protection, differential privacy
has been applied to federated learning [3, 11]. Previous works mostly focus on either the differential
privacy mechanism that requires a central trusted party or the theoretical analysis of LDP techniques.
Practical solutions for deep learning tasks data and tasks have not been well studied.
3 Our Approach
In the framework of LDP-FL as shown in Fig.1, the cloud is an aggregator that collects a set of
weights of local client models from the local side and averages the weights after each communication
round. The goal is to maximize the accuracy of both cloud and local client models while preserving
users’ privacy. In our proposed algorithm, we will alter and approximate each local information
with a randomized mechanism. This is done to totally hide a single client’s contribution within the
aggregation and thus within the entire decentralized learning procedure.
3.1 Overview of LDP-FL
In this section, we introduce the federated learning approach with LDP consists of two steps, as
shown in Algorithm 1.
Cloud Update. First, the cloud initializes the weights randomly at the beginning. Let n be the
total number of local clients. Then, in the r-th communication round, the cloud will randomly
select nr ≤ n clients to update their weights for local-side optimization. Unlike the previous works
[3, 10, 25], where they assume that the aggregator already knows the identities (e.g., IP addresses) of
the users but not their private data, our approach assumes the client remains anonymous to the cloud.
For example, the client can leverage a changing IP address or the same IP address for all clients to
send the local weights back to the cloud. This approach can provide us more robust privacy bound
and practical solution and more details in section 3.2.
Local Update. For each client, it contains its own private dataset. In each communication, the selected
local clients will update their local model by the weight from the cloud. Next, the local model uses
Stochastic Gradient Descent (SGD) to optimize the distinct local models’ weights in parallel. In order
to provide a practical privacy protection approach, we split and shuffle each local model’s weights
and send each weight through an anonymous mechanism to the cloud. In this case, we can provide
more reliable privacy protection and give a practical solution with available results in the final.
3.2 Privacy-Preserving Mechanism
Data Perturbation. Given the weights w of a model, the algorithm returns a perturbed tuple w∗ by
randomizing each dimension of w. LetM be our mechanism, for each weight/entry p ∈ w, assuming
p ∈ [c− r, c+ r] where c is the center of p’s range and r is the radius of the range (c, r depend on
how we clip the weight). Our LDP mechanism changes p to p∗ with two intuitions. First, p∗ can
only be one of two discrete values: one larger, the other smaller, which makes it easy to prove LDP.
Then, to ensure the noise has zero mean, i.e., E(p∗) = p, we set p∗ to the larger value with a high
probability if p itself is large, and set p∗ to the smaller value with a high probability if p itself is small.
Therefore, we design the following LDP mechanism to perturb p.
p∗ =M(p) =

c+ r · e+1e−1 with probability (p−c)(e
−1)+r(e+1)
2r(e+1) ,
c− r · e+1e−1 with probability −(p−c)(e
−1)+r(e+1)
2r(e+1)
(2)
where p∗ is the reported noisy weight by our proposed LDP. Algorithm 2 shows the pseudo-code of
this mechanism.
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Figure 2: Splitting and Shuffling of LDP-FL.
Algorithm 1: LDP-FL
Input: n is the number of local clients; B is
the local mini-batch size, E the
number of local epochs, γ is the
learning rate.
1 CloudUpdate
2 Initialize weights w0;
3 for each round r = 1, 2, . . . do
4 nr ← random set of nr local clients,
where nr ≤ n;
5 W← clients(wt, nr); % Collect all
weights from Clients;
6 for each id ∈W do
7 wr+1[id]← 1nr
∑
(p,id,t)∈W p; %
Take mean of each weight of local
models by id and reformat wr+1;
8 SendToClient(wt+1) % Update clients;
9 LocalUpdate(w, nr)
10 Initialize weight information setW;
11 for each local client c ∈ kr in parallel do
12 wc ← w;
13 for each local Epoch i = 1, 2, ...E do
14 for each batch b ∈ B do
15 wc ← wc − γ 5 L(wc; b);
16 w∗c ← DataPertubation(wc);
17 W←W ∪ SplitShuffle(w∗c );
18 Order all (p, id, t) ∈W by time t;
19 SendToCloud(p, id, t) by time t;
Algorithm 2: DataPertubation
Input: Original w.
Output: w∗ after data perturbation
1 Prefix the range of the w and then we have
fixed c and r;
2 for each weight p ∈ w do
3 Sample a Bernoulli variable u such that
4 Pr[u = 1] = (p−c)(e
−1)+r(e+1)
2r(e+1) ;
5 if u==1 then
6 p∗ = c+ r · e+1e−1 ;
7 else
8 p∗ = c− r · e+1e−1 ;
9 replace p as p∗;
10 After perturb all p ∈ w, then we have
w → w∗;
11 return w∗.
Algorithm 3: SplitShuffle
Input: Perturbed w after Algorithm 2
Output: w∗ after shuffling approach
1 Initialize a weight information set w∗;
2 for each weight and its id (p, id) ∈ w do
3 t← Random Sample a Time;
4 w∗ ← w∗ ∪ (p, id, t);
5 return w∗.
In previous mechanisms [1, 23], the generated noisy data is close to its original value with high
probability, still revealing information, whereas our approach makes the noisy data very distinct from
its original value. For example, while c = 0, r = 1 and  = 1, the perturbed information only could
be either e+1e−1 ≈ 2.163953 or −1.0 · e+1e−1 ≈ −2.163953 for any the original data.
Splitting & Shuffling. The shuffling mechanism includes two parts: splitting and shuffling. The
primary purpose is to give stronger privacy protection while using LDP on federated learning.
Compared to traditional machine learning, deep learning needs more communications and weights for
better performance, causing more privacy leakage during traditional federated learning. So, splitting
and shuffling can help to save much privacy budget during the training phase.
Splitting breaks the private connections of each local client model’s weights, and shuffling breaks the
privacy of communications between the local clients and cloud. For a better shuffling approach, each
client also samples a random time for sending each weight to the cloud in Algorithm 3. Fig.2 shows
the idea of splitting and shuffling of the weights of each local client model that contains two main
steps. For local model A,B,C, each model has the same structure but with different weight values.
Original federated learning is to send the models’ information to the cloud, as shown in Fig.2 (1). In
4
our approach, first, for each model, we split the weights of each local model. Then, for each weight,
we shuffle them though the client anonymity mechanism and send each weight with its id to the cloud,
where id indicates the location of the weight value in the network structure. Finally, splitting and
shuffling can ensure the cloud collects the right weight values to update the central model without
any knowledge about the relation of each weight and local clients.
In practice, client anonymity can be achieved via faking source IP, VPN, proxy, Tor, secure multi-
party computation, etc [9]. Through splitting and shuffling, the cloud does not know the received
information from which local client model. Privacy could be better protected.
4 Privacy and Utility Analysis
In this section, we analyze the privacy and utility of our approach, compare it with other LDP
mechanisms, and compare DP and LDP.
4.1 Local Differential Privacy
First, we prove the proposed noise addition mechanismM satisfies LDP.
Theorem 1. Given any single number p ∈ [c− r, c+ r], where c is the center of the p’s range and r
is the radius of the range, the proposed mechanismM in Eq. 2 satisfies -LDP.
4.2 Client Anonymity
As we claimed before, LDP-FL uses splitting and shuffling to bypass the curse of dimensionality.
Since the weights are split and uploaded anonymously, the cloud is unable to link different weight
values from the same client, so it cannot infer more information about a particular client. Therefore,
it is sufficient to protect -LDP for each weight. Likewise, because of the anonymity, the cloud is
unable to link weights from the same client at different iterations. Without splitting and shuffling,
the privacy budget of LDP will grow to Td, where T is the iteration number and d is the number of
weights in the model. Similar discussion can be found in [10, 9]. Unlike our approach, the previous
works shuffle the ordered sequential information.
4.3 Bias and Variance
Suppose the true average is p¯ =
1
n
∑
u pu for each p ∈ w, the proposed LDP mechanism in Eq. 2
induces zero bias in calculating the average weightM(p) = 1
n
∑
uM(p). Algorithm 2 introduces
zero bias to estimating average weights, i.e., E[M(p)] = p¯.
Next, the proposed mechanism leads to a small variance to each reported weightM(p). LetM
be the proposed data perturbed mechanism. Given any number p, the variance of the mechanism is
V ar[M(p)] = r2O(e− + e−2). For the variance of the estimated average weightM(p), we have
the lower bound and upper bound as below. LetM(p) be the estimated average weight. The lower
bound and upper bound of the estimated average weight is:
r2(e + 1)2
n(e − 1)2 −
r2
n
≤ V ar[M(p)] ≤
r2(e + 1)2
n(e − 1)2 . The variance is large when r is large,  is small, or n is small. By Lemma 4.3, we
conclude the following theorem that shows the accuracy guarantee of the proposed LDP mechanism.
Theorem 2. For any weight p ∈ w of any local model, with at least 1− β probability,
|M(p)− p¯| < O
(
r
√− log β

√
n
)
.
4.4 Comparison with Other Mechanisms
First, existing mechanisms generate noisy data that is close to its original value w.h.p., revealing
the original value’s confidence interval. For instance, Laplace and Gaussian mechanisms add small
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noise w.h.p. and randomized response based mechanisms keep the data unchanged w.h.p. On the
contrary, the proposed mechanism chooses one out of two extreme values as the noisy data, making
it more distinct from its original value. Then, we compare with the following popular mechanisms
specifically.
Randomized Response Mechanism. Google’s Rappor [10] and generalized randomized response [29]
are for binary or categorical data only, whereas data are numeric in the scenario of federated learning.
A modified version of generalized randomized response mechanism [3] was proposed, but it introduces
asymptotically higher variance to the estimated average than ours and is only feasible when  is very
large.
ScalarDP [3]. ScalarDP introduces a variance r2maxO(−2/3) to the noisy data (Lemma 4.4 in [3]),
whereas our variance bound is tighter (Lemma 4.3). Besides, this work [3] assumes the attacker has
little prior knowledge about user data and  is large.
Laplace Mechanism. If we apply the Laplace mechanism to each client’s data p, the variance is
Var[M(p)] = 2∆22 = 8r
2
2 . The variance of estimated average over n clients is Var[M(p)] =
Var[M(p)]
n =
8r2
n2 . In our best case (Equation 8), the Laplace mechanism’s variance is always higher
than ours for any . We also compare with Laplace in terms of absolute data perturbation |p∗ − p| to
prove our mechanism is securer in the appendix. For instance, when  = 1, our data perturbation is
greater than Laplace’s with probability 0.79 in the best case. Therefore, we claim our mechanism
makes noisy data more distinct from its original value than Laplace mechanism.
Gaussian Mechanism. Currently, most works on -LDP do not relax its definition with δ. However,
the Gaussian mechanism introduces δ [8], making it weaker than LDP [5]. δ is the probability that
indicates those highly unlikely “bad” events. These “bad” events may break -differential privacy
and usually defined by the size of the dataset in previous works [? 28]. As a result, the Gaussian
Mechanism is less secure than our mechanism (without introducing δ).
4.5 Discussion: DP vs LDP
There is a blurry line between DP and LDP. In general, they differ in definition and in whether the
noise is added locally or on the server. However, they are not mutually exclusive. The definition of
LDP is a special case of that of DP. Also, sometimes noises are added locally to achieve DP instead
of LDP, e.g., via additive secret sharing.
We can prove that any mechanism for DP can also be used to achieve LDP.
Theorem 3. LetM be any mechanism satisfying -differential privacy. ApplyingM to each value
of a dataset containing k values satisfies k-LDP.
5 Experiments
In this section, image classification tasks and a real mobile application are used as experimental
examples to evaluate the effectiveness of LDP-FL. We first examine the effect of different weights
based on the image benchmark datasets, MNIST [15], Fashion-MNIST [30] and then verify the
performance improvement based on CIFAR-10 [13] and the preceding three datasets.
To verify the performance improvement brought by LDP-FL, we need to mainly evaluate the
performance with the number of the client. For MNIST and Fashion-MNIST, we implement a two-
layer CNN for image classification. However, for CIFAR-10, the default network from Pytorch library
only achieves around 50% accuracy without data perturbation, and we re-design a small VGG [26] for
the task. The training data and the testing data are fed into the network directly in each client, and for
each client, the size of the training data is the total number of the training samples divides the number
of the clients. In this case, a larger number of clients implicits the small size of the training data of
each client. For each weight, we clip them in a fixed range. In this work, we set (c, r) = (0, 0.075)
and r = 0.015 for MNIST and Fashion-MNIST. For CIFAR-10, due to the complexity of the network,
we set c = 0 and r is set by the weight range of each layer. The learning rate γ is set as 0.03 for
MNIST and 0.015 for CIFAR-10. Considering the randomness during perturbation, we run the test
experiments ten times independently to obtain an averaged value.
6
50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500
Number of clients
90
92
94
96
98
Ac
cu
ra
cy
 (%
)
Noise-free
LDP-FL
(a) Effect of n on MNIST ( = 1)
50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500
Number of clients
76
78
80
82
84
86
88
90
Ac
cu
ra
cy
 (%
)
Noise-free
LDP-FL
(b) Effect of n on Fashion-MNIST
( = 10)
50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500
Number of clients
45
50
55
60
65
70
75
80
Ac
cu
ra
cy
 (%
)
Noise-free
LDP-FL
(c) Effect of n on CIFAR ( = 10)
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
Epsilon
10
50
90
100
Ac
cu
ra
cy
 (%
)
Noise-free
LDP-FL
(d) Effect of  on MNIST (n =
100)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Epsilon
68
80
85
88
Ac
cu
ra
cy
 (%
)
Noise-free
LDP-FL
(e) Effect of  on Fashion-MNIST
(n = 200)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Epsilon
10
40
55
62
Ac
cu
ra
cy
 (%
)
Noise-free
LDP-FL
(f) Effect of  on CIFAR (n = 500)
Figure 3: Effect of n and  when the model has been trained with the pre-assigned perturbation which is
represented by the brown dash line.
The proposed models are implemented using Pytorch, and all experiments are done with a single
GPU NVIDIA GTX Titan on the local server. MNSIT and Fashion-MNIST can be within an hour
with 10 communication rounds, and CIFAR-10 needs about 2 hours with 15 communication rounds.
5.1 Performance Analysis and Comparison
Fig. 3 shows that LDP-FL can achieve performance with a low privacy cost because of the new
design of the communication and the new local data perturbation. It is not hard to see that while
increasing the number of clients n in training, the LDP-FL can perform as close as the noise-free
federated learning. Compared with MNIST (n = 100), CIFAR-10 (n = 500) needs more clients,
which indicates that for a more complex task with a larger neural network model, it requires more
local data and more clients for a better performance against the data perturbation. The privacy budget
also affects the performance of the central model, but more details will be discussed in the next
section.
Some existing works also want to solve the privacy concern on similar tasks. Geyer et al. [11] first
apply DP on federated learning. While they use 100 clients, they can only achieve 78% accuracy with
380 communication rounds. Bhowmick et al.[3] first utilize the LDP in federated learning. Due to the
high variance of their mechanism, it requires more than 200 communication rounds and spends much
more privacy budgets, i.e., MNIST ( = 500) and CIFAR-10 ( = 5000). Last, the most recent work
[27] utilizes Condensed Local Differential Privacy (α-CLDP) into federated learning, with 86.93%
accuracy on Fashion-MNIST dataset. However, α-CLDP achieved that performance by requiring a
relatively privacy budget  = α · 2c · 10ρ (e.g. α = 1, c = 1, ρ = 10), which results in a weak privacy
guarantee. Compared to existing works, our approach can first use much fewer communication rounds
between clients and cloud (i.e., 10 for MNIST, 15 for Fashion-MNIST and CIFAR-10), which makes
the whole solution more practical in real life. Second, we can achieve 96.24% accuracy with  = 1
and n = 100, 86.26% accuracy with  = 4, n = 200 and 61.46% accuracy with  = 10, n = 500 on
MNIST, Fashion-MNIST and CIFAR-10, respectively. Overall, LDP-FL achieves better performance
on both effectiveness and efficiency than relevant works.
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Table 1: Summary of Accuracy and Privacy Budget Analysis
noise-free =0.1 =0.5 =1 =5 =10
MNIST-LDP (n=100) 97.26% 13.84% 95.36% 96.24% 96.34% 96.39%
Fashion-MNIST-LDP (n=200) 87.53% 10.00% 10.00% 68.21% 85.95% 86.10%
CIFAR-LDP (n=500) 61.46% 10.00% 10.00% 10.00% 58.89% 60.37%
5.2 Analysis of Privacy Budget
The privacy budget represents the privacy cost in the framework. To analyze the impact of privacy
budgets on performance, we choose the scale from 0.1 to 1 for MNIST and 1 to 10 for CIFAR-10 in
Table 1. It is obvious that more complex data and tasks require more privacy cost. The main reason
is that the complex task requires a sophisticated neural network, which contains a large number of
model weights. Meanwhile, the range of each weight is also wider in the complex task.
Fig. 3 shows that LDP-FL can maintain the accuracy at a high value for a wide range of privacy
budgets on MNIST ( > 0.3), Fashion-MNIST ( > 2) and CIFAR-10 ( > 5). While  < 0.3 for
MNIST and  < 5, the accuracy decreases by 90% ( = 0.1), 15% ( = 1) and 50% ( = 1) for
MNIST, Fashion-MNIST and CIFAR-10, respectively. The accuracy almost keeps unchanged until
 decreases to 0.1 for MNIST and 1 for CIFAR-10, respectively, because the performance drops to
10%, which is the same as a random guess in these two datasets. Fashion-MNIST is between MNIST
and CIFAR-10, and it can get an excellent performance after  = 3. These results argue that LDP-FL
applies to different privacy requirements. It can effectively improve the performance even when the
privacy budget is relatively tight than previous works and other mechanisms. In addition, we show the
accuracy of LDP-FLwhen the number of clients is increasing. It is not hard to see that more clients
can afford more noise due to the privacy analysis we show in the last section.
6 Related Work
Differential privacy [8] has been widely studied in last ten years. Recently, more works studies how
to use DP in deep learning [1, 23] or use DP in federated learning [11, 19]. In order to achieve a
stronger privacy protection than traditional differential privacy, a few recent works start to use LDP
[4, 5, 10] into the federated learning [3, 21, 25, 27].
However, existing approaches utilize LDP into federated learning, which can not be used for deep
learning models. Some of them [21, 25] do not support deep learning approaches yet, which only focus
on small tasks and simple datasets. The other works [3, 27] studied the LDP on federated learning
problem. However, as we discussed in the experiments part, both of them hardly achieve a good
performance with a small limited budget. Due to the high variance of the noises in their approaches,
it requires more communication rounds between cloud and clients, which spends more privacy cost
in their framework. Our approach focus on solving the weakness of all previous approaches and
accelerates the practical solution on complex dataset.
7 Conclusion and Future Plan
In this paper, we propose a new mechanism for LDP, show how to apply it to protect federated learning,
and apply splitting and shuffling to each clients’ gradients to mitigate the privacy degradation caused
by high data dimension and many query iterations. Empirical studies demonstrate our system performs
better than previous related works on the same image classification tasks. Hopefully, our work can
considerably accelerate the practical applications of LDP in federated learning.
In the future, several research topics can be further explored, such as preventing client anonymization
from side-channel attacks, designing a better data perturbation mechanism, and applying the proposed
mechanism to natural language processing, speech recognition or graph learning. Moreover, it is of
profound significance to generalize the proposed privacy-preserving techniques to other scenarios.
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A Proof
Theorem 1. Given any single number p ∈ [c− r, c+ r], where c is the center of the p’s range and r
is the radius of the range, the proposed mechanismM in Eq. 2 satisfies -LDP.
Proof. We know the weight p’s range is [c − r, c + r]. If p∗ = c + r · e+1e−1 , then for any p, p′ ∈
[c− r, c+ r].
Pr[M(p) = p∗]
Pr[M(p′) = p∗] ≤
max
p
Pr[M(p) = p∗]
min
p′
Pr[M(p′) = p∗] =
r(e − 1) + r(e + 1)
−r(e − 1) + r(e + 1) = e
. (3)
If p∗ = c− r · e+1e−1 , the above still holds.
Algorithm 2 introduces zero bias to estimating average weights, i.e., E[M(p)] = p¯.
Proof. For any weight update pu from any client u,
E[M(pu)] =
(
c+ r · e
 + 1
e − 1
)
· (pu − c)(e
 − 1) + r(e + 1)
2r(e + 1)
+
(
c− r · e
 + 1
e − 1
)
· −(pu − c)(e
 − 1) + r(e + 1)
2r(e + 1)
=
2(pu − c)(e − 1)k
2k(e − 1) + c
=pu.
(4)
E[M(p)] = E
[
1
n
∑
u
M(pu)
]
=
1
n
∑
u
E[M(pu)] = 1
n
∑
u
p = p¯. (5)
LetM be the proposed data perturbed mechanism. Given any number p, the variance of the mecha-
nism is V ar[M(p)] = r2O(e− + e−2).
Proof. The variance of each reported noisy weight pu is
Var[M(pu)] = E(A2(pu))−E2(M(pu)) = r2
(
e + 1
e − 1
)2
−(pu−c)2 < r2(1+ 2
e
)2 = r2O(e−+e−2).
(6)
Let M(p) be the estimated average weight. The lower bound and upper bound of the estimated
average weight is:
r2(e + 1)2
n(e − 1)2 −
r2
n
≤ V ar[M(p)] ≤ r
2(e + 1)2
n(e − 1)2 .
Proof. The variance of the estimated average weight is
Var[M(p)] = 1
n2
∑
u
Var[M(pu)] = r
2(e + 1)2
n(e − 1)2 −
1
n2
∑
u
(p− c)2. (7)
So the bound of variance is
r2(e + 1)2
n(e − 1)2 −
r2
n
≤ Var[M(p)] ≤ r
2(e + 1)2
n(e − 1)2 . (8)
Theorem 2. For any weight p ∈ w of any local model, with at least 1− β probability,
|M(p)− p¯| < O
(
r
√− log β

√
n
)
.
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Proof. For each client u, |M(pu)−pu| ≤ r · e
 + 1
e − 1 +r =
2re
e − 1 and Var[M(pu)] = Var[M(pu)−
pu] = E[(M(pu)−pu)2]−E2[M(pu)−pu] = E[(M(pu)−pu)2]−(pu−pu)2 = E[(M(pu)−pu)2],
by Bernstein’s inequality,
Pr[|M(p)− p¯| ≥ λ] = Pr[|
∑
u
(M(pu)− pu)| ≥ nλ]
≤2 · exp
−
1
2
n2λ2∑
u E((M(pu)− pu)2) +
2nλre
3(e − 1)

=2 · exp
− n2λ2
2
∑
u Var[M(pu)] +
4nλre
3(e − 1)

≤2 · exp
− n2λ2
2nr2
(
e + 1
e − 1
)2
+
4nλre
3(e − 1)

=2 · exp
− nλ2
2r2
(
e + 1
e − 1
)2
+
4λre
3(e − 1)

=2 · exp
(
− nλ
2
r2O(−2) + λrO(−1)
)
.
(9)
In other words, there exists λ = O
(
r
√− log β

√
n
)
such that |M(p) − p¯| < λ holds with at least
1− β probability.
Theorem 3. LetM be any mechanism satisfying -differential privacy. ApplyingM to each value
of a dataset containing k values satisfies k-LDP.
Proof. First, let’s assume suppose the dataset D has only one value x with domain X and treat the
identity function as the query function. The query function’s sensitivity is the difference between
the max and min of x. Then, we apply any mechanism M satisfying -DP to x, so for any x, x′ ∈
X , Pr[M(x)=xˆ]Pr[M(x′)=xˆ] ≤ e, which also satisfy -LDP by definition. Now, if the dataset D has k values, we
can apply the same mechanismM to each value independently, and achieve k-LDP because
Pr[M(x) = xˆ, . . . ,M(xk) = xˆk]
Pr[M(x′) = xˆ, . . . ,M(x′k) = xˆk]
=
k∏
i=1
Pr[M(xi) = xˆi]
Pr[M(x′i) = xˆi]
≤
k∏
i=1
e = ek. (10)
B Comparison with Laplace Mechanism in Absolute Perturbation
By the definition of Laplace distribution, we can derive that with probability 1−F, |p∗−p| ≤ 2r ln 1F .
In our LDP mechanism, 2re−1 ≤ |p∗ − p| ≤ 2r + 2re−1 . Therefore, we can draw Figure 5 to compare
with Laplace Mechanism. It shows our mechanism makes the noisy data more distinct from its original
value when  is small. For instance, when  = 1, our data perturbation is greater than Laplace’s
with probability 0.79/0.44 in the best/worst case. When  = 0.1, our data perturbation is greater w.p.
0.86/0.61 in the best/worst case.
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Figure 4: Parameter Analysis on epoch and fraction of clients. For MNIST, we set the number of total clients as
100. For CIFAR-10, the number of total clients is set as 500.
Figure 5: Comparison with Laplace mechanism.
C Experiment
C.1 Parameter Analysis
In order to evaluate the performance of the LDP-FL, we need to fine-turn different parameters in the
system. Here we listed the most critical parameters, including the privacy budget , communication
round R, the number of clients k, the fraction of clients f . The fraction of clients f denotes the
random select the percentage of the clients to update the global model in each communication.
The parameters f and R are two important parameters in the proposed noisy training. Fig. 4 shows
the change of the performance with varying f and R. In this work, we evaluate the proposed model
on MNIST, Fashion-MNIST and CIFAR. To evaluate the parameter f , we first fix the number of the
client as 500. It can be found that when f is too small, it does not affect the performance on MNIST
and Fashion-MNIST, but effects significant on CIFAR-10 compared between the proposed LDP-FL
and the baseline, which does not add any noise perturbation. When f is close to 1, LDP-FL can
achieve almost the same performance as the baseline on MNST, Fashion-MNIST and CIFAR-10.
Another important parameter is the communication rounds between cloud and clients. It is not hard
to see that with more communications, we can train a better model on MNIST, Fashion-MNIST and
CIFAR-10 through the proposed model. However, due to the complexity of data and tasks, CIFAR-10
needs more epochs for a better model, which is close to the baseline. All the details are shown in
Fig. 4.
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